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Abstract
This paper considers a multi-user single-relay wireless network, where the relay gets paid for
helping the users forward signals, and the users pay to receive the relay service. We study the relay
power allocation and pricing problems, and model the interaction between the users and the relay as
a two-level Stackelberg game. In this game, the relay, modeled as the service provider and the leader
of the game, sets the relay price to maximize its revenue; while the users are modeled as customers
and the followers who buy power from the relay for higher transmission rates. We use a bargaining
game to model the negotiation among users to achieve a fair allocation of the relay power. Based on
the proposed fair relay power allocation rule, the optimal relay power price that maximizes the relay
revenue is derived analytically. Simulation shows that the proposed power allocation scheme achieves
higher network sum-rate and relay revenue than the even power allocation. Furthermore, compared with
the sum-rate-optimal solution, simulation shows that the proposed scheme achieves better fairness with
comparable network sum-rate for a wide range of network scenarios. The proposed pricing and power
allocation solutions are also shown to be consistent with the laws of supply and demand.
Index terms: Multi-user relay network, power allocation, pricing, Stackelberg game, Kailai-
Smorodinsky bargaining solution (KSBS).
I. INTRODUCTION
Cooperative communication has been shown to be a promising concept for future wireless
networks (e.g., [1], [2]). The basic idea is to have multiple nodes in the network help each
other’s transmission to achieve diversity. Numerous cooperative relaying strategies aiming at
2optimizing the global network performance have been proposed. Two widely used ones are
amplify-and-forward (AF) and decode-and-forward (DF). For AF, the relays simply forward
amplified versions of the signals they receive without decoding. For DF, the relays decode their
received signals and transmit the re-encoded signals [3]. While pioneering efforts in cooperative
networks focus on single-user networks (e.g., [4]–[9]), research on multi-user networks, in which
multiple transmissions of different users can be supported, are important to meet the demands of
future communication systems. One such model is the multi-user single-relay network (e.g., [10]–
[16]). Capacity bounds of the network are investigated in [10], [11], and interference cancellation
schemes are proposed in [12], [13]. In [14] and [15], network decoding is applied to combat
interference among users in multi-user single-relay networks. In [16], the resource allocation
problem, including both the subcarrier allocation and the relay power allocation, in a multi-user
single-relay network is studied to maximize the sum-rate.
In the aforementioned papers, nodes in a network are assumed to be altruistic and willing to
cooperate to optimize the overall network performance. In many practical applications, however,
nodes are selfish and aim to optimize their own benefits or quality-of-service. On the other hand,
due to limited resources available, multiple selfish users in the network have conflicts in resource
allocation. It is important to find solutions that achieve both high overall network performance
and fairness among users. To model and analyze these behaviors, game theory is often used [17].
Research in cooperative network designs using game theory become increasingly popular in
recent years. Many papers have appeared in literature, e.g., [18]–[25]. [18] considers the uplink
of a network with multiple users and single base station, in which users can form coalitions
and share resources to form a virtual multi-antenna system to improve performance. A merge-
and-split algorithm is proposed to construct coalitions among users to maximize utilities, which
are defined as the transmission rates. In [19] and [20], a two-user network where each user
can also work as a relay for the other is studied. By employing a two-user bargaining game,
fair bandwidth allocation [19] and power allocation [20] are found from the Nash bargaining
solution. In [21], the relay power allocation problem in the downlink of a multi-user multi-relay
cellular network is studied. Non-cooperative game theory is used to model the competition for
relay power among users. An iterative scheme is proposed to ensure all users reach the Nash
3equilibrium point.
None of the aforementioned works consider the cooperation stimulation problem. In a relay
network, one possible solution to user cooperation stimulation is the payment-based scheme,
where the relays get paid if they forward users’ messages and users pay for the relay service.
Here, relays and users aim to maximize their own payoffs instead of the overall network
performance. In [22]–[25], the pricing mechanism is used to encourage the relays to help forward
packets for the users. For multi-user ad hoc networks, compensation frameworks are proposed
in [22] and [23], in which a network node sets price and receives revenue if it cooperatively
helps others’ transmissions. In [24], for a single-user multi-relay network, the relay selection
and relay power control are investigated using a two-level Stackelberg game. In this game, the
relays compete to provide service to the user to gain revenue. [25] studies the user power control
and relay pricing problems in a multi-user single-relay network. In the game theoretic model,
the relay sets the price to maximize its revenue, while a non-cooperative game is used to model
the user behavior, in which each user adjusts its transmit power to selfishly maximize its own
utility. A distributed iterative scheme is proposed to achieve the unique Nash equilibrium point.
In this paper, we consider a multi-user single-relay network and use game theory to model and
analyze the user and relay behavior. Amplify-and-forward is adopted due to its simplicity and low
computational load. Pricing mechanism is used where the relay gets paid for signal forwarding
and users pay for the relay service. We model the interaction between the relay and the users as a
two-level Stackelberg game, in which the relay is the leader and sets the unit power price for the
relay service, and users are the followers where each user decides how much power to purchase
from the relay. Different from [25], we consider the relay power allocation among users, instead
of the user power control; and also we model the relay power competition among users as a
cooperative bargaining game. For the relay power allocation, the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining
solution (KSBS) is used for fairness. The power allocation problem is transformed into a convex
optimization problem. With the KSBS-based relay power allocation, We analytically find the
optimal relay price that maximizes the relay revenue. From our simulations, compared with
the sum-rate-optimal power allocation, the proposed KSBS-based power allocation is fairer and
achieves close-to-optimal sum-rate for a wide range of network scenarios. Compared with the
4even power allocation, the proposed KSBS-based power allocation archives higher relay revenue
and network sum-rate. It is also shown via simulations that the proposed relay pricing and power
allocation solutions are consistent with the laws of supply and demand.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II gives a brief background review on
game theory. Section III describes the multi-user single-relay cooperative network model and the
Stackelberg game and bargaining game models for the relay pricing and relay power allocation
problems. In Section IV, we analyze the relay power pricing and power allocation problems.
The optimal relay price is solved analytically, while the relay power allocation is transformed
into a convex optimization problem. Section V discusses the properties of the proposed solutions
and their possible implementation. Simulation results are shown in Section VI. Conclusions are
drawn in Section VII.
II. REVIEW OF GAME THEORY
In this section, we provide a brief review of game theory and introduce the basic concepts
and results that will be used in this paper.
Game theory mainly analyzes behavior in strategic situations, or games, in which players
influence each other’s decision and performance [28]. A game consists of three parts: a set of
players, a set of actions of the players, and a set of utilities that represent the players’ relative
satisfaction of the outcome of the game. Equilibrium is the strategy outcome of a game that is
the best response of each user given the decision of others. The most famous equilibrium is the
Nash equilibrium, in which no player can increase its utility by unilaterally changing its own
strategy, and the corresponding strategy set and utilities constitute a Nash equilibrium.
A. Stackelberg Game
In a Stackelberg game, one player acts as a leader who takes action first, and the other players
are followers who observe the leader’s action and act accordingly. The subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium of the Stackelberg game can be found using the backward induction method. It
first studies the followers’ game: for each possible action of the leader, it finds the optimal
followers’ response that maximizes the followers’ payoff. Then given the optimal followers’
5response strategy, it studies the leader’s action and chooses the one that maximizes the leader’s
utility. The chosen strategy set is the Stackelberg equilibrium [28].
B. Bargaining Game and Kailai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution (KSBS)
A bargaining game models the bargaining interactions of players. In a bargaining problem,
there are N players with utilities u1, u2, · · ·uN . A utility vector u = (u1 u2 · · · uN) is
called feasible if it is possible to find a strategy set that gives the ith player utility ui for all
i = 1, · · · , N . Let S denote the set of all feasible utility vectors. The disagreement point, denoted
as u0 = (u1,0 u2,0 . . . uN,0), is the vector of the minimal utility that each player expects if the
players do not reach an agreement and play non-cooperatively. It is the guaranteed utility for the
players in the bargaining game. The ideal point uI = (uI1 uI2 . . . uIN) (the superscript ‘I’ stands
for ideal) is the vector of the maximum achievable utilities of the players in S. We thus have
uIi ≥ ui,0. Note that for players with uIi = ui,0, cooperation does not increase their utilities and
they will not enter the game. For the rest of the players, uIi > ui,0 and they will participate in
the bargaining process.
Given S, the disagreement point u0, and the ideal point uI , players negotiate with each other to
select one feasible solution u and the corresponding strategy set that all players agree. Depending
on how players define fairness, they may select different solutions. One popular solution for the
bargaining game is the KSBS [29], which is the solution to the optimization problem
max k s.t.
ui − ui,0
uIi − ui,0
= k (1)
for all participating players with uIi > ui,0.
KSBS is an equilibrium point that guarantees fairness in the sense of equal penalty, which can
be deducted from the constraint in (1). In (1), (uIi −ui,0) and (ui−ui,0) are Player i’s maximum
and actual net utility gains, respectively. Taking logarithm on both sides of the constraint in (1),
we have
log (uIi − ui,0)− log (ui − ui,0) = − log k. (2)
As log k is a constant independent of the players, the constraint in (1) forces all players partic-
ipating in the bargaining game to suffer the same quality penalty in the logarithmic scale, and
6thus ensures fairness in this sense. It is worth mentioning that KSBS is neither individual utility
optimal nor global optimal in general. It is an equilibrium point that balances the proposed utility
measure and fairness among users.
III. GAME MODELS FOR RELAY POWER ALLOCATION AND PRICING
In this section, we explain the network model, elaborate the relay power pricing and relay
power allocation problems, and propose the game theoretical models for the problems using a
Stackelberg game and a bargaining game.
A. Network Model
Consider a wireless network with N users communicating with their destinations with the
help of one relay as shown in Figure 1. Denote the channel gain from User i to Destination i
Relay
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Fig. 1. Multi-user single-relay network.
(direct link) as hi, the channel gain from User i to the relay as fi, and the channel gain from the
relay to Destination i as gi. The relay and destination are assumed to have global and perfect
channel state information (CSI) f1, · · · , fN , g1, · · · , gN through training and feedback. No CSI
is required at the users. User i uses transmit power Qi and the maximum transmit power of the
relay is P .
Frequency division multiple access (FDMA) is used, so transmissions of different users are
orthogonal and interference-free. Without loss of generality, we elaborate the transmission of
7User i’s message on Channel i. We use the popular half-duplex two-step AF relaying protocol.
Let si be the information symbol of User i. It is normalized as E(|si|2) = 1, where E stands
for the average. In the first step, User i transmits
√
Qisi. The signals received by the relay and
Destination i are
yiR =
√
Qisifi + niR and yiD =
√
Qisihi + niD, (3)
respectively, where niR and niD are the additive noises at the relay and the destination in the
first step, respectively. In the second step, the relay amplifies its received signal and forwards it
to Destination i. Denote the power the relay uses to help User i as Pi. Since the relay has perfect
CSI, coherent power coefficient is used for better performance [26], [27]. The signal received
at Destination i can be shown to be
yRi =
√
QiPi
Qi|fi|2 + 1sifigi +
√
Pi
Qi|fi|2 + 1giniR + nRD, (4)
where nRD is the additive noise at the destination in the second step. All noises are assumed to
be i.i.d. additive circularly symmetric complex Gaussian with zero-mean and unit-variance.
After maximum-ratio combining of both the direct path and the relay path, the effective
received signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR) of User i’s transmission can be shown to be
SNRi =
QiPi|figi|2
Pi|gi|2 +Qi|fi|2 + 1 +Qi|hi|
2. (5)
If User i’s transmission is not helped by the relay and only the direct transmission is active, the
received SNR of User i’s transmission becomes
SNRiD = Qi|hi|2. (6)
B. Game Theoretical Model for Relay Pricing and Relay Power Allocation
In this paper, we focus on the relay power allocation among users and the relay power pricing.
In early relay network designs, many research focused on relay power allocation that optimizes
the global network performance. In these models, the relay has no gain and selflessly helps the
users using its own power; and the users are also selfless, who care about the global network
performance instead of their own benefits. In many practical applications, however, the relay
8needs incentives for cooperation. Also, there is a natural conflict among users, who want to
obtain help from the relay to maximize their individual benefits. With no payment for the relay
power, each user wants as much power as possible, which leads to undesirable situations, e.g.,
the total power demand from users exceeds the relay power budget. This motivates the use of
game theory to model the selfish behavior of the users and the relay. Our goal is to find a fair
power allocation among the users and the optimal relay pricing strategy. We use the Stackelberg
game to model the interaction between the users and the relay, and the bargaining game to model
the relay power allocation among the users, which, as explained in Section II, is a natural fit.
We consider the relay as the leader of the Stackelberg game who sets the price of its power
in helping the users. The key point of the relay game is for the relay to set the price to gain the
maximum revenue. The relay revenue, denoted as uR, is the total payment from the users. We
use a simple pricing model by assuming that the relay revenue is linear in the amount of power
it sells, i.e., uR =
∑N
i=1 λPi, where λ is the normalized unit price of the relay power and Pi is
the power the relay uses to help User i.
We consider the users as followers of the Stackelberg game that react in a rational way
given the unit price of the relay power. The bargaining game is used to model the cooperative
interaction among users. That is, we assume that users make agreements to cooperatively share
the relay power. A key point of formulating the users as selfish players in a bargaining game is
to design the utility function, which should reflect both the quality-of-service and the payment-
for-service of users. Its physical meaning can be the benefits received by the users. In this paper,
we seek to design an appropriate utility function that is not only physically meaningful, but also
mathematically attractive to ensure tractability and convergence.
We define the utility of User i as
ui ,
QiPi|figi|2
Pi|gi|2 +Qi|fi|2 + 1 +Qi|hi|
2 − λPi, i = 1 · · ·N, (7)
which, for a given network scenario, is a function of Pi, the power the relay uses to help User
i. The first two terms of (7) correspond to the effective received SNR of User i given in (5)
and represent the quality-of-service of the user. It is directly related to the performance of the
communication, e.g., the achievable rate. The last term λPi represents the user’s normalized cost
9in purchasing the relay service. If User i does not buy any power from the relay and uses the
direct transmission only, i.e., Pi = 0, its utility is the minimum utility that User i expects. Thus
ui,0 = Qi|hi|2. (8)
In the following section, we analyze the above Stackelberg game and bargaining game models
to find the optimal relay power pricing and a fair power allocation among the users.
IV. RELAY POWER ALLOCATION AND PRICING SOLUTIONS
In this section, we solve the power allocation and pricing problems jointly using the backward
induction method [28]. That is, we first solve the user game, i.e., the relay power allocation among
the users for a given price of the relay power, then solve the relay game, i.e., the optimal price
of the relay power, based on the derived user bargaining strategy. The user game and the relay
game are formulated and analyzed in the following two subsections, respectively.
A. Relay Power Allocation Based on KSBS
The user game is to find the relay power allocation among the users for a given unit power
price λ. We use the bargaining game in cooperative game theory to find a fair power allocation.
Specifically, we look for the KSBS of the bargaining game, the background of which is provided
in Section II-B.
We first calculate User i’s ideal utility uIi of a given λ. To maximize its utility, User i’s goal
is
max
Pi
ui s.t. ui ≥ ui,0, 0 ≤ Pi ≤ P. (9)
The first constraint in (9) ensures that User i gets no less utility than ui,0, which is its utility
when it receives no help from the relay, i.e., Pi = 0. The second constraint ensures that the power
demand of User i does not exceed the total power budget P of the relay. Given a relay power
price, this optimization problem can be solved analytically and the result is given in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1: Define
bi ,
Qi|figi|2
Qi|fi|2 + 1 . (10)
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Given the unit relay power price λ, the ideal power demand of User i that maximizes its utility
ui in (7) is
P Ii (λ) =


0 if λ ≥ bi
Qi|fi|2√
bi
( 1√
λ
− 1√
bi
) if bi > λ > bi
(
biP
Qi|fi|2 + 1
)−2
P if λ ≤ bi
(
biP
Qi|fi|2 + 1
)−2 . (11)
The ideal utility of User i is
uIi (λ) =


ui,0 if λ ≥ bi,
Qi|fi|2(1−
√
λ/bi)
2 + ui,0 if bi > λ > bi
(
biP
Qi|fi|2 + 1
)−2
biP
(Qi|fi|2)−1biP+1 − λP + ui,0 if λ ≤ bi
(
biP
Qi|fi|2 + 1
)−2 . (12)
Proof: From (7), we have
∂ui
∂Pi
= bi
(
biPi
Qi|fi|2 + 1
)−2
− λ, ∂
2ui
∂2Pi
=
−2(Qi|fi|2)−1b2i
[(Qi|fi|2)−1biPi + 1]3 .
Thus ∂2ui
∂2Pi
< 0, which means that ui is a concave function of Pi.
When λ ≥ bi, ∂ui∂Pi ≤ 0 for all Pi ≥ 0 as [(Qi|fi|2)−1biPi + 1]2 > 1. So ui is a non-increasing
function of Pi and its maximum is reached at P Ii (λ) = 0. When λ ≤ bi
(
biP
Qi|fi|2 + 1
)−2
,
∂ui
∂Pi
≥ 0
for all Pi ≤ P . So ui is a non-decreasing function of Pi, and P Ii (λ) = P in this case. When
bi > λ > bi
(
biP
Qi|fi|2 + 1
)−2
, ui reaches its maximum when ∂ui∂Pi = 0, i.e., Pi =
Qi|fi|2√
bi
( 1√
λ
− 1√
bi
).
This proves the ideal power solution in (11). Using this solution and the equalities (7) and (8),
we can obtain the ideal utility for User i in (12).
From Lemma 1, we see that P Ii (λ) is independent of User i’s direct link hi. Intuitively, this
is because the contribution of the direct link to User i’s receive SNR and utility is fixed and
keeps unchanged for any amount of relay power that User i obtains.
Lemma 1 also shows that when the price is too high, Case 1 in (11), User i will not buy
any relay service. When the price is too low, Case 3 in (11), User i wants to purchase all relay
power to maximize its utility. For the price range shown in Case 2 in (11), User i asks for part
of the relay power that gives the ideal balance between its SNR and its payment to maximize its
utility. The ideal power demand of User i depends not only on the relay power price, but also
on its power constraint Qi and the quality of its local channels fi and gi. The bi defined in (10),
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whose value depends on User i’s condition only, is an important parameter. As shown in (11), it
not only determines whether a relay asks for the relay service but also affects how much power
a user asks for ideally. We can see bi as a quality measure for User i to some extent. For any
two users, User i and User j, assume that bi > bj . We can see that if User i is not allocated any
relay power, which happens when bi ≤ λ, User j will not be allocated any relay power either
because its bj is smaller. Also, for a given price λ, increasing the Qi and |fi|2 of User i, which
increases bi, results in higher or the same relay power demand from User i, which is shown in
the following lemma.
Lemma 2: Given a relay power price λ, P Ii (λ) is a non-decreasing function of Qi and |fi|2.
Proof: From (11), we get, when bi > λ > bi
(
biP
Qi|fi|2 + 1
)−2
,
P Ii (λ) =
Qi|fi|2
bi
(√
bi
λ
− 1
)
=
Qi|fi|2 + 1
|gi|2
{√
|gi|2
λ[1 + 1/(Qi|fi|2)] − 1
}
.
For other two price ranges, when λ ≥ bi P Ii (λ) = 0, and when λ ≤ bi
(
biP
Qi|fi|2 + 1
)−2
, P Ii (λ) =
P . So, in all price ranges,
P Ii (λ) = max
[
0,min
(
Qi|fi|2 + 1
|gi|2
{√
|gi|2
λ[1 + 1/(Qi|fi|2)] − 1
}
, P
)]
.
max and min are non-decreasing functions. For a given λ, Qi|fi|
2+1
|gi|2
{√
|gi|2
λ[1+1/(Qi|fi|2)] − 1
}
is
also a non-decreasing function of Qi and |fi|2. So we conclude that P Ii (λ) is a non-decreasing
function of Qi and |fi|2.
To find the KSBS of the user bargaining game, without loss of generality, we assume that the
users are sorted in the descending order of their bi values, that is
b1 ≥ b2 ≥ · · · ≥ bN . (13)
With the given price λ, for users satisfying bi ≤ λ, as shown in Lemma 1, their ideal power
demand is 0 so they do not buy any power from the relay, thus do not enter the game.
Let L be the number of users satisfying bi > λ. That is, with the ordering in (13), assume
that bL > λ > bL+1. The first L users will participate in the bargaining game and purchase the
relay service. Given λ, to find the KSBS-based power allocation of the L users is equivalent to
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solving the following optimization problem [29]:
max
Pi
k s.t.
biPi
(Qi|fi|2)−1biPi+1 − λPi
uIi − ui,0
= k,
L∑
i=1
Pi ≤ P, 0 < Pi < Qi|fi|2
(
1
λ
− 1
bi
)
, (14)
where uIi and ui,0, given in (12) and (8) respectively, are the ideal and minimal utilities of User
i. The second constraint in (14) is due to the total power constraint of the relay, and the last
constraint is to ensure the feasibility of the solution and is derived from rewriting ui > ui,0.
In the proof of Lemma 1, we have shown that ui is a concave function of Pi. Also, ui = ui,0
at Pi = 0 and Pi = Qi|fi|2 (1/λ− 1/bi), and ui reaches its maximum uIi (λ) at Pi = P Ii (λ).
An example of ui as a function of Pi is given in Figure 2. It can be shown from the utility
definition in (7) that for each u ∈ (ui,0, uIi (λ)), there are two possible choices of Pi in the
range (0, Qi|fi|2 (1/λ− 1/bi)) that satisfy ui(Pi) = u: one in the range
(
0, P Ii (λ)
]
and the other
in the range
[
P Ii (λ), Qi|fi|2 (1/λ− 1/bi)
)
. Thus we can shrink the feasible region of Pi from
(0, Qi|fi|2 (1/λ− 1/bi)) to either one of the smaller regions. We choose the first region for two
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reasons. First, for the same ui value, this choice results in a smaller Pi than choosing the second
region, and the users prefer to buy less power to gain the same utility. Second, smaller power
consumption for each user saves relay power, so more users can be helped. Thus, (14) becomes
max
Pi
k s.t.
biPi
(Qi|fi|2)−1biPi+1 − λPi
uIi − ui,0
= k,
L∑
i=1
Pi ≤ P, 0 < Pi ≤ P Ii (λ). (15)
To solve this optimization problem, we prove the following lemma.
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Lemma 3: The relay power allocation problem in (15) is equivalent to the following max-min
problem:
max
Pi
min
i
{
biPi
(Qi|fi|2)−1biPi+1 − λPi
uIi − ui,0
}
, s.t.
L∑
i=1
Pi ≤ P, 0 < Pi ≤ P Ii (λ). (16)
Proof: First we use the notation ψi(Pi) ,
biPi
(Qi|fi|
2)−1biPi+1
−λPi
uIi−ui,0
. To prove this lemma, it is
sufficient to show that the power allocation solution in (16), denoted as (P ∗1 , · · · , P ∗L), satisfies
ψ1(P
∗
1 ) = · · · = ψL(P ∗L). We prove this by contradiction. Without loss of generality, suppose
that ψ1(P ∗1 ) < ψ2(P ∗2 ) < min{ψ3(P ∗3 ), · · · , ψL(P ∗L)}. Thus, maxPi mini ψi(P ∗i ) = ψ1(P ∗1 ). Since
ψ1(P1), ψ2(P2) are increasing and continuous functions of P1, P2 in the feasible region given
in (16), there exists a small enough positive ǫ such that P ∗1 + ǫ, P ∗2 − ǫ are still in the feasible
region and
ψ1(P
∗
1 ) < ψ1(P
∗
1 + ǫ) < ψ2(P
∗
2 − ǫ) < ψ2(P ∗2 ).
The new power allocation (P ∗1 + ǫ, P ∗2 − ǫ, P ∗3 , · · · , P ∗L) satisfies all power constraints in (16). Its
max-min value is ψ1(P ∗1+ǫ) which is larger than the max-min value of the solution (P ∗1 , · · · , P ∗L).
This contradicts the assumption that (P ∗1 , · · · , P ∗L) is optimal, thus completes the proof.
(16) is a convex optimization problem and can be solved efficiently using standard convex
optimization techniques [30]. We call the solution of (16) the KSBS-based power allocation.
Recall that in (16), only the L users whose bi’s are larger than the relay price λ participate in
the game. The remaining N − L users request no relay power.
In the game theoretical model in (16), the power constraint at the relay is taken into consid-
eration. For any relay price λ, (16) will result in a feasible power allocation among users, i.e.,
the total power demanded by the users does not exceed the relay power constraint. Without the
game theoretical model, if, for example, for a given price, the users request their ideal relay
powers to maximize their individual utilities, it may happen that the total power demand of
the users exceeds the relay power constraint, and the relay cannot make a satisfactory power
allocation. With the proposed KSBS-based relay power allocation, when the sum of the ideal
power demands of all users does not exceed the relay power constraint, the users will be allocated
their ideal powers, in which case, k in (15) reaches its maximum 1; when the sum of the ideal
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power demands of all users exceeds the relay power constraint, the proposed KSBS-based power
allocation will allocate all relay power to the users fairly. This is shown in the following lemma.
Lemma 4: For a fixed λ, let the ideal power allocation of User i be P Ii (λ), which is given
in (11); and let the KSBS-based power allocation be PKi (λ) (K stands for KSBS). When∑L
i=1 P
I
i (λ) ≤ P , we have PKi (λ) = P Ii (λ); when
∑L
i=1 P
I
i (λ) > P , we have
∑L
i=1 P
K
i (λ) = P .
Proof: Again, we use the notation ψi(Pi) ,
biPi
(Qi|fi|
2)−1biPi+1
−λPi
uIi−ui,0
. With the new feasible region
of Pi in (16), ψi(Pi)’s are increasing functions and reach their maximum 1 when Pi = P Ii (λ).
Thus k ∈ [0, 1] and achieves the maximum k = 1 if and only if ∑Li=1 P Ii (λ) ≤ P , that is, when
users can reach their ideal utility with a feasible relay power. In this case, PKi (λ) = P Ii (λ).
If
∑L
i=1 P
I
i (λ) > P , not all users can reach their ideal utilities and thus k < 1. From the
equivalent form (15), actually no user can reach its ideal utility. That is, PKi (λ) < P Ii (λ).
Suppose that
∑L
i=1 P
K
i (λ) < P . Define
ǫ , min
i
{
P −∑Li=1 PKi (λ)
L
, P I1 (λ)− PK1 (λ), · · · , P IL(λ)− PKL (λ)
}
.
ǫ is a positive number. Now consider the power allocation P˜i(λ) , PKi (λ) + ǫ. First, this new
power allocation satisfies all power constraints due to its construction. Also, as ψi’s are increasing
functions, the new power allocation results in a higher minimum value, that is mini ψi(P˜i(λ)) >
mini ψi(P
K
i (λ)), which contradicts the assumption that PKi (λ) is optimal. This completes the
proof.
B. Optimal Relay Power Price
Now we investigate the relay pricing problem. The price of the relay power is crucial to the
relay revenue and the relay power allocation among the users. If the relay sets the price too
high, no user will buy any power, and the relay revenue will be zero. If the relay sets the price
too low, all users will ask for as much power as possible; and even though all relay power can
be sold, the relay revenue will not be maximized.
With the unit price of the relay power λ, from Section III, and by using the KSBS-based relay
power allocation in Section IV.A, the revenue of the relay is
∑N
i=1 λP
K
i (λ), where PKi (λ) is
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the relay power allocated to User i based on the KSBS for the given price λ. The relay pricing
problem can be formulated as:
max
λ
N∑
i=1
λPKi (λ). (17)
Note that the relay power constraint
∑N
i=1 P
K
i (λ) ≤ P is always guaranteed by the KSBS-based
power allocation, thus needs not to appear explicitly in the relay revenue maximization.
To solve the relay pricing problem, we first prove the following lemma.
Lemma 5: The optimal price is inside the interval [blb, b1), where blb satisfies the following
equation:
φ(blb) ,
N∑
i=1
max
{
0,
Qi|fi|2√
bi
(
1√
blb
− 1√
bi
)}
= P (18)
and
blb ≥ max
i
{
bi
(
biP
Qi|fi|2 + 1
)−2}
(19)
Proof: First we can see that φ(blb) monotonically decreases from ∞ to 0 as blb increases
from 0 to b1. Thus, the equation (18) has a unique positive solution inside (0, b1).
Then we prove (19) by contradiction. Assume that blb < b1
(
b1P
Q1|f1|2 + 1
)−2
. Thus,
φ(blb) ≥ max
{
0,
Q1|f1|2√
b1
(
1√
blb
− 1√
b1
)}
> P,
which conflicts (18). So blb ≥ b1
(
b1P
Q1|f1|2 + 1
)−2
. Similarly, we can show that blb ≥ bi
(
biP
Qi|fi|2 + 1
)−2
for i = 2, · · · , N . Thus (19) is proved.
Now we show that the optimal price is no less than blb. Using the result in (19) and from
(11), when the relay power price is blb, i.e., λ = blb, we have
N∑
i=1
P Ii (blb) = φ(blb) = P. (20)
Also from (11), P Ii (λ) is a continuous and non-increasing function of λ. So
∑N
i=1 P
I
i (λ) is a
continuous and non-increasing function of λ. Inside the price range [0, blb], i.e., λ < blb, we have∑L
i=1 P
I
i (λ) ≥ P based on (20). With the KSBS-based power allocation, according to Lemma 4,
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all power of the relay will be allocated to the users , i.e.,
∑L
i=1 P
K
i (λ) = P . The relay revenue
maximization when the price is with [0, blb] becomes:
max
0≤λ≤blb
λ
L∑
i=1
PKi (λ) = blbP, (21)
which is reached at λ = blb. So the optimal price in the range [0, blb] is blb, which shows that
the optimal price is no less than blb.
To prove the upper bound on the relay price, note that when λ ≥ b1, from (11), P Ii (λ) = 0
for all i, i.e., no user will buy any power from the relay and the relay revenue will be 0. So any
price in the range [b1,+∞) is not optimal for the relay revenue, and the optimal price must be
in the range [blb, b1).
The value of blb can be obtained by solving the equation in (18). This is a generalized
waterfilling problem [32], where 1/
√
λ is the water-level, 1/
√
bi is the ground level of User
i, and Qi|fi|2/
√
bi are the weights that can be visually interpreted as the width of each patch. In
this paper, we can find the value of blb analytically. Notice that φ(blb) is a decreasing function
of blb and bi’s are in non-increasing order. We can first find the M such that φ(bM) < P and
φ(bM+1) > P . Thus, blb ∈ [bM , bM+1]. Within this interval, φ(blb) =
∑M
i=1
Qi|fi|2√
bi
(
1√
blb
− 1√
bi
)
=(∑M
i=1
Qi|fi|2√
bi
)
1√
blb
−
(∑M
i=1
Qi|fi|2
bi
)
. Thus, from φ(blb) = P , we have
blb =
(
M∑
i=1
Qi|fi|2√
bi
)2(
P +
M∑
i=1
Qi|fi|2
bi
)−2
. (22)
In what follows, we solve the optimal relay power price analytically. First, several notation
are introduced. Recall the ordering of the users based on their bi values in (13) and M is the
index such that bM ≥ blb ≥ bM+1. That is, the bi’s of the first M users are no less than blb,
while the bi’s of the remaining users are no larger than blb. We have shown in Lemma 5 that
only the price range [blb, b1) needs to be considered for the optimal price. Define γi , bi for
i = 1, · · · ,M and γM+1 , blb. Further define Γ1 , [γ2, γ1) and Γi , [γi+1, γi] for i =, 2 · · · ,M .
We thus can have divided the price range [blb, b1) into the following M intervals:
[blb, b1)=[blb, bM ] ∪ [bM , bM−1] ∪ · · · ∪ [b3, b2] ∪ [b2, b1)
,ΓM ∪ ΓM−1 · · · ∪ Γ2 ∪ Γ1. (23)
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Inside the price range [blb, b1), because
∑N
i=1 P
I
i (λ) is a non-increasing function of λ and (18),
we have
∑N
i=1 P
I
i (λ) ≤ P . Thus, PKi (λ) = P Ii (λ) from Lemma 4. We can thus rewrite the price
optimization problem in (17) into
max
i=1,2,···M
max
λ∈Γi
i∑
j=1
λP Ij (λ). (24)
In (24), we have decomposed the optimization problem into M subproblems, where the ith
subproblem is to find the optimal price within the range Γi where User 1 to i purchase non-zero
power from the relay:
Sub-problem i : max
λ∈Γi
i∑
j=1
λP Ij (λ). (25)
The following proposition is proved to solve the sub-problem.
Proposition 1: For i = 1, 2, · · · ,M , define
ci ,
(∑i
j=1Qj |fj|2/
√
bj
2
∑i
j=1Qj |fj|2/bj
)2
. (26)
The solution to (25) is
λi ,


γi+1 if ci < γi+1,
γi if ci > γi,
ci if γi+1 ≤ ci ≤ γi.
(27)
Proof: When λ ∈ Γi, for 1 ≤ j ≤ i, from (11), User j will ask for Qi|fi|2√bi
(
1√
λ
− 1√
bi
)
units
of power, and User (i + 1) to User M will ask for zero relay power. Subproblem (25) can be
rewritten as
max
λ∈Γi
{
λ
i∑
j=1
Qi|fi|2√
bi
(
1√
λ
− 1√
bi
)}
= max
λ∈Γi
φR,i(λ), (28)
where φR,i(λ) ,
(∑i
j=1
Qj |fj |2√
bj
)√
λ −
(∑i
j=1
Qj |fj |2
bj
)
λ. In (28), φR,i(λ) is the relay revenue
given the price λ ∈ Γi. It can be shown through straightforward calculation that dφR,i(λ)/dλ = 0
when λ = ci, defined in Proposition 1, and d
2φR,i(λ)
dλ2
< 0, when λ ∈ Γi. Therefore, if ci > γi,
φR,i(λ) reaches its maximum at γi; if ci < γi+1, it reaches its maximum at γi+1; and if γi+1 ≤
ci ≤ γi, it reaches its maximum at ci.
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With the subproblems solved, we are ready to find the optimal relay power price. The result
is given in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: The optimal relay power price, denoted as λ∗, is
λ∗ = argmax
λi
{(
i∑
j=1
Qj|fj |2√
bj
)√
λi −
i∑
j=1
Qj |fj|2
bj
λi
}
, (29)
where λi is defined in Proposition 1.
Proof: This is a natural result of Proposition 1 and (24).
With Theorem 1, we can find the optimal price for the relay power by solving the M
subproblems in (24) analytically using Proposition 1, then find the optimal price among the M
sub-problem solutions that results in the maximum relay revenue. This is written as Algorithm 1.
We can see that, after ordering (whose average complexity is N logN), its complexity is linear
in the number of users in the network.
Algorithm 1 Optimal relay power price.
1: Calculate bi’s using (10). Order the N users such that b1 ≥ b2 ≥ · · · ≥ bN .
2: Find M then blb using (22).
3: Initialize γi: γi = bi for i = 1, · · · ,M and γM+1 = blb.
4: Calculate ci’s for i = 1, · · · ,M using (26).
5: For i = 1, · · · ,M , find λi using (27).
6: Find the optimal price λ∗ using (29).
Previously, we have shown that bi is an important factor for the ideal relay power. Here we
can see that it is also important for the optimal relay price. We prove the following lemma,
which further reflects the importance of bi.
Lemma 6: If b1 < 4blb, the optimal price for the relay is blb.
Proof: First recall that b1 ≥ · · · ≥ bM−1 ≥ bM ≥ blb. When b1 < 4blb, for i = 1, · · · ,M
and j = 1, · · · , i, we have bj ≤ b1 < 4γM+1 ≤ 4γi+1. Therefore,
Qj |fj|2√
4γi+1
<
Qj |fj|2√
bj
⇔ Qj |fj|
2√
bj
<
2Qj|fj|2√γi+1
bj
,
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and
√
ci =
∑i
j=1Qj|fj |2/
√
bj
2
∑i
j=1Qj |fj|2/bj
<
2
√
γi+1
∑i
j=1Qj |fj|2/bj
2
∑i
j=1Qj |fj|2/bj
=
√
γi+1
for i = 1, · · · ,M . From Proposition 1, within the range Γi where i = 1, · · · ,M , the optimal
price is γi+1, the lower bound of Γi. So the optimal price in the range [γM+1, γ1) is γM+1, which
is blb.
Lemma 6 says that when the difference between b1 and blb is small, that is, the conditions
of the users are not too separate apart, the relay should set its price to be low so all users can
gain some benefits. On the contrary, when some users have a much higher bi than others, the
price will be higher than blb and those users with lower bi’s may not purchase the relay service
because the price is too high compared to the SNR gain they may receive.
V. DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss possible implementation of the proposed relay power allocation and
pricing solutions, properties of the power allocation solution, and applications of the proposed
solutions to some special network scenarios.
The first to discuss is the implementation of the proposed relay power allocation and power
pricing solutions. In practical network applications, to use the proposed scheme, the relay, which
is the service provider and has perfect and global channel knowledge, first finds the optimal price
of the relay power using Algorithm 1. With this optimal price, the relay then finds the KSBS-
based solution for the relay power allocation problem given in (16). With this implementation,
we actually assume that the relay is trustworthy. All users believe that the relay will not change
the parameter values (e.g., the CSI); and the relay uses the above procedure to set the price
and determine the KSBS-based power allocation, and follows the results to help all users in
their transmission. For the relay to know the channel gains from the users to itself, training and
channel estimation should be performed at the relay. For the relay to know the channel gains
from itself to the destinations, feedback from the destinations to the relay are required. The
proposed algorithm is a centralized one instead of distributed.
Now we discuss properties of the KSBS-based power allocation. When the relay sets its price
to be the optimal, from the analysis in Section IV-B, all users will be allocated their ideal relay
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powers, P Ii (λ), and the individual utilities of the users are maximized. This is the ideal case and
requires the relay to have perfect CSI. However, in reality, CSI at the relay is subject to error and
delay, in which case, the relay may set a price different to the optimal one. Sometimes, the relay
may want to set its price different to the optimal one due to other reasons such as marketing
considerations. Our bargaining game model and KSBS-based power allocation is robust to the
relay price fluctuation in the sense that a “fair” relay power allocation among the users can still
be made. Specifically, if the relay power price is set to be higher than or equal to blb, defined
in (18), with the KSBS-based power allocation, each user gets its ideal power demand; if the
relay power price is set to be lower than blb, no user can get its ideal relay power but the relay
power will be fairly allocated to the users such that the utility losses of the users are the same
in the logarithmic scale; and all relay power will allocated.
Finally, we discuss the application of the proposed solution to two special network scenarios.
One network application is the multi-user, single-relay, and single-destination network, also
addressed as multi-access relay network (MARN) in some papers [10]–[16]. The proposed
scheme can be directly applied to MARNs by setting g1 = · · · = gN in the network formulation.
From Lemma 2, P Ii (λ) is a non-decreasing functions of Qi and fi. Thus, with the relay to
destination channel the same for all users, users with better user-relay channels or higher transmit
powers will be allocated more relay power. Another popular network scenario is the multi-user
single-relay network with no direct links. Our solutions again can be applied straightforwardly
as the solutions are independent of the direct link.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we show the simulated performance of the proposed relay power allocation
and pricing solutions, and compare them with the sum-rate-optimal power allocation and the
even power allocation. Sum-rate-optimal power allocation solution is the relay power allocation
among the users that maximizes the network sum-rate. For the even power allocation, the relay
allocates 1/N of its total power to each of the N user, and each user decides how much power
to buy from the relay to maximize its utility. That is, the relay power allocated to User i is
min{P Ii (λ), P/N}. Two channel models are considered: the Rayleigh flat-fading channel and
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Fig. 3. Three-user relay network with Rayleigh fading channels and different relay power constraints.
the static channel with path-loss only.
A. Network with Rayleigh Flat-Fading Channels
In the first numerical experiment, the channels are modeled as i.i.d. Rayleigh flat-fading, i.e.,
fi, hi, and gi are generated as i.i.d. random variables following the distribution CN (0, 1). We
consider a network with three users. The transmit powers of the users are set to be 10 dB. The
simulation results follow the same trend for other values of user powers.
We first investigate the network performance when the relay power ranges from 10 dB to 40
dB. This corresponds to the scenario where the total user demand is fixed while the relay power
supply increases. We set the relay power price to be the optimal according to Theorem 1. Figure
3 shows the optimal relay power price, the relay power actually sold, and the maximum relay
revenue under different relay power constraints. We can see that when the relay has more power
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to sell, the optimal relay power price is lower, more relay power is sold, and the relay receives
more revenue. This complies with one of the laws of supply and demand [33], which says that
if supply increases and demand remains unchanged, then it leads to lower equilibrium price and
higher quantity.
Figure 4 compares the network sum-rate and fairness of the proposed KSBS-based power
allocation with those of the sum-rate-optimal power allocation and the even power allocation.
We set the relay power price to be the optimal according to Theorem 1. It can be seen that for
the system sum-rate, the difference between our algorithm and the sum-rate-optimal solutions is
within 3.5%, while it is within 13% between the sum-rate-optimal and the even power solutions.
The proposed solution is about 5 dB superior to the even power allocation. To quantify the
fairness of different allocation schemes, we use the average value of the normalized difference:
[maxi(ri)−mini(ri)]/maxi(ri), where ri is the achievable rate of User i. A smaller difference
indicates a fairer solution. We can see that our solution achieves similar fairness to the even
power solution and is fairer than the sum-rate-optimal one.
Next, we examine the trend of the optimal relay price with an increasing demand. From
Lemma 2, P Ii (λ) is a non-decreasing function of |fi|2. So, we can use an increasing |fi|2 to
simulate the increasing user demand. In this numerical experiment, we again consider a three-
user network and model all channels as independent circularly symmetric complex Gaussian
random variables with zero-mean, that is, they are independent Rayleigh flat-fading channels.
The variances of all gi’s and hi’s are 1, while the variance of all fi’s ranges from 1 to 20. A
larger variance means a higher average value of |fi|2, which on average means a higher power
demand from the users. The transmit power of the users is set to be 10 dB and relay power is
set to be 20 dB. Figure 5 shows the optimal relay power price, the actual relay power sold, and
the maximum relay revenue with different variances of fi. We can see that as the variance of fi
increases, the optimal relay price increases, more relay power is sold, and the maximum relay
revenue increases. This fits one of the laws of supply and demand, which says, if the supply is
unchanged and demand increases, it leads to higher equilibrium price and quantity.
In the third numerical experiment, we examine the relationship between the optimal relay
price and the number of users. We assume that the relay power is fixed to be 20 dB. The user
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Fig. 4. System sum-rate and fairness of a three-user relay network with Rayleigh-fading channels.
power is fixed as 10 dB but the number of users vary from 5 to 15. All channels are generated
following the distribution CN (0, 1). Figure 6 shows the optimal relay power price, the total
relay power sold, and the maximum relay revenue with different numbers of users. We can see
that as the number of users increases, the optimal relay power price increases, the relay power
actually sold increases, and the maximum relay revenue increases. Figure 6 verifies the same
law as Figure 5, which says, if the supply is unchanged and demand increases, it leads to higher
equilibrium price and quantity.
B. Static Network with Path-Loss Channel Only
In this subsection, we study a static network whose channels are deterministic instead of
random. The network has three users, one relay, and three destinations. The relative positions of
the nodes are shown in Figure 7, where the coordinates of User 1-3, the relay, and Destination
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Fig. 5. Three-user relay network with Rayleigh fading channels and different variances of fi.
1-3 are (-15, 3), (-10, 0), (-5, -3), (0, 0), and (5, 3), (5, 0), (5, -3), respectively. We consider
the path-loss effect of wireless channels only by assuming that the channel gains are inverse
proportional to the distance squared. In Figure 7, User 1 is the farthest from its destination and
thus has the worst channel; while User 3 is the closest to its destination and has the best channel.
The power of the users is set to be 10 dB and the power of the relay is set to be 15 dB.
In Figure 8, the total power sold to the three users, the relay revenue, and the network sum-
rate are shown as the relay power price varies. Three power allocation solutions are presented:
the proposed KSBS-based power allocation, the sum-rate-optimal power allocation, and the
even power allocation. Note that the sum-rate-optimal allocation solution aims to maximize
the network sum-rate, is independent of the relay power price, and allocates all the relay power
P to the three users. We can observe from Figure 8 that, when the price is higher, with the
KSBS-based and the even power allocation schemes, the users purchase less power from the
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Fig. 6. Three-user relay network with Rayleigh fading channels and different numbers of users.
User 1
User 2
User 3
Destination 1
Destination 2
Destination 3
Relay
Fig. 7. A three-user static network.
relay and the total power demand is smaller. For example, using the KSBS-based allocation
scheme, the total power demand is less than P when the price is higher than 0.0023. Now let
us look at different price ranges separately. First, we can see that in the price range [0, 0.0007],
both KSBS-based and the even power allocation schemes sell all relay power to the users. This
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Fig. 8. Power allocation, relay revenue, and sum-rate in three-user relay network with static channels.
is because in this price range, P Ii (λ) ≥ P/3 for i = 1, 2, 3, thus with the even power allocation,
each user will buy P/3, and all relay power will be sold; for the KSBS-based power allocation,∑3
i=1 P
I
i (λ) ≥ P , so all power of the relay will be purchased by the users based on Lemma 4.
Second, when λ ≥ 0.0047, the even power and the KSBS-based schemes give the same power
allocation results. This is because in this price range, all three users’ ideal power demands are
no more than P/3, that is, P Ii (λ) ≤ P/3 for i = 1, 2, 3 and
∑3
i=1 P
I
i (λ) ≤ P . In this scenario,
from Lemma 4, both the even power allocation and the KSBS-based schemes assign the ideal
power demand P Ii (λ) to User i, and the two schemes have the same performance. And when
λ is in the range [0.0007, 0.0047], the KSBS-based power allocation demands more relay power
than the even power allocation, and thus the relay receives a higher revenue in this range. This
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TABLE I
ACHIEVABLE RATES, NORMALIZED RATE-DIFFERENCE, AND THE SYSTEM SUM-RATE IN THREE USER RELAY NETWORK
WITH STATIC CHANNELS
Sum-rate 0 0.0013 0.0027 0.0047 0.0053
-optimal Even KSBS Even KSBS Even KSBS Even KSBS Even KSBS
r1 0.0356 0.0498 0.0499 0.0356 0.0356 0.0356 0.0356 0.0356 0.0356 0.0356 0.0356
r2 0.0838 0.1017 0.0994 0.1017 0.0991 0.0823 0.0823 0.0627 0.0627 0.0627 0.0627
r3 0.2802 0.2127 0.2169 0.2127 0.2643 0.2127 0.2727 0.1992 0.1992 0.1777 0.1777
Rate-difference 0.8729 0.7658 0.7701 0.8325 0.8652 0.8325 0.8694 0.8211 0.8211 0.7995 0.7995
Sum-rate 0.3997 0.3641 0.3662 0.3500 0.3989 0.3306 0.3907 0.2975 0.2975 0.2760 0.2760
is because with the even power allocation, a user cannot request more than 1/3 of the total
relay power, while the KSBS-based scheme does not have this constraint and thus enables users
to request more power. Furthermore, when λ is 0.0027 and the KSBS-based scheme demands
91% of the relay power to be sold to the users, the relay revenue is maximized. At this relay
power price, the network sum-rate difference between the proposed KSBS-based solution and
the sum-rate-optimal power allocation is only about 2%. The sum-rate difference between the
even power and the sum-rate-optimal schemes, however, is 23% at the price λ = 0.0047, which
is the relay revenue maximizing price under the even power allocation. For any relay price, the
sum-rate difference between the even power and the sum-rate-optimal schemes is no less than
9%.
To further compare the performance of the three schemes, Table I shows each user’s achievable
rate, the normalized rate-difference, and the network sum-rate with the three power allocation
schemes at the relay power prices 0, 0.0013, 0.0027, 0.0047 and 0.0053. Recall that a smaller
normalized rate-difference represents a fairer power allocation. As can be seen from Table I, the
proposed KSBS-based scheme achieves a smaller normalized rate difference than the sum-rate-
optimal solution for all relay prices, while the network sum-rate difference between these two
schemes is small. It shows that the proposed solution is fairer than the sum-rate-optimal solution
with comparable network sum-rate. In sum, Figure 8 and Table I show that for the simulated
network, the proposed KSBS-based power allocation and relay pricing solutions achieve close-to-
optimal sum-rate, in the mean while, they also maximize the relay revenue and achieve fairness
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Fig. 9. Sum-rate and relay power price in three user relay network with static channels.
among users.
To compare the sum-rates of the proposed solutions and the sum-rate-optimal solution, we
show in Figure 9 the network sum-rate of the proposed relay pricing and power allocation
solutions as the relay power constraint P varies. We can see that when the relay power constraint
P is small, indicating high demand and low supply, the sum-rate of the proposed solution
is almost the same as the optimal sum-rate of the network. As the relay power constraint P
increases, indicating low demand and high supply, the sum-rate difference between the proposed
solutions and the sum-rate-optimal solution increases. When the relay power is 25 dB, the
difference is about 6%. The optimal relay price, on the other hand, decreases as P increases.
These verifies the same law of supply and demand with Figure 3, which says, if supply increases
and demand remains unchanged, then it leads to lower equilibrium price.
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VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study the relay power allocation problem in a multi-user single-relay network.
By introducing a relay power price, we take into consideration the incentives for cooperation at
the relay in helping the users. The Stackelberg game is used to model the interaction between
the relay and the users, in which the relay acts as the leader who sets the price of its power
to gain the maximum revenue and the users act as followers who pay for the relay service.
To model the competition among users, a bargaining game and its KSBS are used for a fair
power allocation. We analytically solve the optimal relay price, while the problem of relay power
allocation among users is transformed into a convex optimization problem and can be solved
with efficient numerical methods. Simulation results show that our solutions reflect the laws of
supply and demand, give better user utilities and relay revenue than even power allocation, and
approach the sum-rate-optimal power allocation in terms of network sum-rate for a wide range
of network scenarios.
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